Abstract-We present techniques for efficient anonymous communication with real-time constraints as necessary for services like telephony, where a continuous data stream has to be transmitted.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE OF THE key questions of a global information infrastructure is privacy protection for its users. This includes not only the confidentiality of message contents, that can be implemented by encryption, but also mechanisms to hide address and routing information. Such privacy may be desired both with respect to outsiders and with respect to information providers the user accesses. Some examples are: 1) individual acts requiring special protection like contacting Alcoholics Anonymous; 2) the fact that the entire pattern of URL's a user accesses has quite a potential for abuse; 3) the protection of contacts between companies. Note that wherever anonymity is not desired, identification can easily be added in higher layers (this is done anyway because network addresses are not trustworthy enough), whereas one cannot implement any anonymous service in higher layers (at least not at a reasonable cost) if the network addresses identify its users.
Several techniques are known that allow privacy even if an adversary may be tapping lines or have (legal or illegal) access to a switching center; see [1] for an overview. The bestManuscript received March 4, 1997; revised September 25, 1997 . An earlier version of this paper was presented at IFIP/Sec'91, "Kommunikation in verteilten Systemen 1991."
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known technique for anonymous communication, and the one we build upon, are mixes [2] . Although all basic techniques are quite old, real interest in applying them in practice has only come up recently. In [3] , the basic mix protocol was used for anonymously submitting messages to the messaging service of a network of mobile computers. Several mix schemes for anonymous e-mail have actually been built, such as Mixmaster [4] and Babel [5] . However, mixes in their original form imply both a significant data expansion and significant delays, and therefore it was often considered infeasible to apply them to services with higher bandwidth and real-time requirements. In this paper, we present the first protocol that overcomes these problems.
To be concrete, we present our protocols in the context of voice and data communication on the narrowband ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) as standardized and actually built by most European PTT's (Post Telegraph Telephone companies). In these networks, each user (i.e., the user's (network terminating) device) is connected to a local exchange via an exclusive wire, whereas the bandwidth is shared in the long-distance network. Voice communication means strict real time during a call and a certain upper bound on the setup time. The ISDN requirements are that: 1) two bit-transparent duplex channels with 64 kb/s each must be offered on two given data channels of exactly this bandwidth; 2) an additional signaling channel of 16 kb/s is available; 3) any additional messages we need should fit into the signaling structure of the given ISDN.
Our techniques can be adapted to other networks as long as a certain delay at the start of a connection is tolerable. For instance, this was done for mobile communication based on the GSM standard in [6] and [7] . In [8] , similar ideas were applied to synchronous communication over TCP/IP networks. Mixes are not the only means for anonymous communication. DC networks [9] , [10] can offer perfect sender anonymity, but can be implemented efficiently only on specific network topologies (e.g., ring). On general networks, the bandwidth expansion is proportional to the number of participants within an anonymity set. Other schemes achieve only a lower degree of anonymity, like Rings [11] , [12] and Crowds [13] .
In Section II, we briefly sketch the original mixes. In Section III, we present our protocols in an abstract way, i.e., in the language of the security community. Section IV contains a precise specification of the protocols for the real ISDN. The 0733-8716/98$10.00 © 1998 IEEE performance is evaluated in Section V. The security achieved is discussed in Section VI, which also shows that billing for network services works in spite of anonymity.
II. BASIC MIXES
The basic idea of mixes [2] is that each message is sent over a series of independent stations, the mixes. Each mix collects a number of messages (called batch), discards repeats, changes the outlooks of the remaining messages by a cryptographic operation, and outputs them in a different order. Thus an outsider, even if he taps all the lines, cannot follow the passage of a message through several mixes unless all these mixes cooperate with him.
The cryptographic operations in the basic scheme [see (2.1)] are as follows:
The sender encrypts the message plus some random bits with a public key of each mix addressed by starting with the last one. This can be visualized as packing the message in successive envelopes. The outermost envelope can only be removed by the first mix, the next envelope by the second mix, etc. This corresponds to decryption with their private keys. The last mix forwards the intended message to the recipient. (Of course, it may still be in an envelope, i.e., encrypted for the intended recipient; this is independent of the mix protocol.)
Even from this brief sketch, one can see that basic mixes are only suitable for nonreal-time communication.
1) There is a significant delay because a mix must wait until it has a sufficiently large amount of messages to mix. 2) Each mix must perform an asymmetric cryptographic operation on the message, which takes a certain time and can only start when at least a long block of the message has arrived. 3) Probabilistic encryption must be used: otherwise, the adversary could observe the messages output by a mix, reencrypt each of them with the public key of the mix, and simply compare which ciphertext equals which input message. Thus each ciphertext is longer by at least the number of random bits used than the previous one, which adds up to a significant bandwidth expansion if several mixes are used. We will only present protocol details for our modified mix schemes, but two more issues are useful to be kept in mind: First, the scheme sketched so far keeps the sender anonymous from the recipient, but a different scheme has to be used if the recipient is supposed to answer without being able to identify the sender. Secondly, no encryption system entirely hides the length of messages. Thus it does not make sense to mix messages whose ciphertexts can be distinguished simply by their lengths in the same batch.
III. ABSTRACT REAL-TIME MIX PROTOCOLS
We present our protocols in two steps. By modifying the original mixes accordingly, first we introduce mix channels, which are a mechanism to mix continuous data streams. There will be two versions, one to keep a sender anonymous from a recipient and one the other way round. These mix channels will later serve as building blocks. However, in particular because of the varying length of phone calls, they cannot simply be used to mix entire connections. Thus, in the second step, we will build the entire abstract protocols by using mix channels for time slices (Real-Time Mixes). They are combined with other ingredients to guarantee sufficient size of the batches without additional cost and for the initial establishment of anonymous connections. We understand anonymous connection as follows: is only anonymous among the people whose channels are mixed with hers by a local exchange in the following denoted by All subscribers of one build an anonymity set by equally acting to the On the network side, it is not possible to map actions of the anonymity set to a single member. If is member of the anonymity set of and of for long distance calls one can only tell if anyone from is communicating with anyone from
A. Building Blocks: Mix Channels
We need an asymmetric and a symmetric encryption system [14] . We denote asymmetric encryption and decryption keys as and where denotes the owner of the key, symmetric keys as and encryption and decryption of a message (with slight but usual abuse of notation) as and respectively. In the concrete parts, we assume that RSA [15] and a symmetric system with 128-b keys like IDEA [16] are used. We assume OFB mode, i.e., a pseudo one-time pad. Thus synchronization as supported by ISDN is a precondition for the protocol, such that each arriving bit can be decrypted at once. The participants must not get out of synch. Keeping this in mind, the usage of a synchronous stream cipher provides for very fast mixing and can be implemented without testing for replays.
We use hybrid encryption of minimal length: If Alice, wants to send a message to Bob, she first generates a key She appends as much of to as fits in the same block of the asymmetric encryption system and encrypts this block with Finally, she encrypts the rest of with
We denote the entire operation by
The randomly chosen key also makes RSA probabilistic, and to prevent attacks from [17] , and the rest of the first block should be mingled by symmetric encryption with a globally known key.
We prescribe that uses a fixed mix cascade, say for all her channels. This does not reduce anonymity; quite the reverse. If no cascade is used, someone who communicates with her more than once might intersect these anonymity sets. Mix cascades also reduce the problem that all messages of a batch must be of equal length and timing problems between the mixes; both are critical for performance. In the ISDN scenario, the cascade will be situated at 's i.e., between user side and network side of the Each for initially generates a key pair and publishes , and shares a symmetric key with With hybrid encryption, we can use the basic mix scheme for very long messages. However, this is not enough for our purpose. Each bit on the data channel should be handled at once, because each mix would still have to wait for the whole first block of data to arrive before it can start decrypting. Therefore we make the asymmetrically encrypted part a separate message that will be sent on the signaling channel before the actual data transmission starts. The actual data can then be transmitted in the data channel without any bandwidth expansion and without delay.
We only consider simplex channels; duplex channels will be realized as a pair of simplex channels. Moreover, we distinguish mix sending channels that keep the sender anonymous and mix receiving channels that keep the recipient anonymous; they will be combined later.
1) Mix Sending Channels:
The sender constructs the setup message for a mix sending channel as follows, where are signaling data that should be output by the last mix of the cascade and are data that wants to give to in addition to the symmetric key (3.2) She sends to the user side of her which passes it to Each receives from or and decrypts it with or respectively. It processes the data in whatever way is intended and forward to or, for further in the network. In the ISDN scenario, this will mean back to the LE for routing in the long-distance network. In our case, we simply have where is a timestamp. In contrast to the original mixes, this eliminates the need to compare messages of different batches for repeats. Because of the fixed mix cascades, the timestamps only have to be local sequence numbers of batches of setup messages.
Each for processes this setup message as follows; see Fig. 1 (what does will be described in the context of the final scheme).
1) It reserves an outgoing data channel to for the following continuous data. It is sensible to sort the outgoing channels in the same way as the corresponding setup messages in the output batch.
2) It tells the position of the outgoing channel to together with the decrypted setup message 3) It stores the correspondence between the incoming and the outgoing channel. 4) It stores as belonging to this correspondence. (Of course, the index " " is only notation; no mix after knows that the key is from 2) Mix Receiving Channels: To make recipients anonymous with respect to senders, we use mix-receiving channels. They have a setup message constructed just like that for a mix-sending channel (except for the part which was left open anyway).
3) Connecting the Two Halves: To make and both anonymous, we will connect a mix-sending channel from with a mix-receiving channel built up by
The basic idea is the innermost parts, of both setup messages contain a common channel label, and, on 's side, routing information to the mix cascade uses. In the ISDN context, this will be the address of 's local exchange. How and agree on the label will be shown in the final scheme. We call the result a mix channel which is shown in Fig. 1 .
4) Mix Data Channels:
Recall, mixing setup messages, and mixing data will be different modules. After establishing a sending channel, can immediately decrypt each bit of data arriving on the incoming channel with and forward it on the corresponding outgoing channel. In Fig. 1 , this is represented as the lower half of the mixes.
For the receiving channel, the corresponding data channel is established and used in the reverse way: Channels from to are reserved. In particular, the last channel leads from to When data arrive on the data channel, encrypts them (not "decrypts" as with a mix-sending channel) with Thus receives multiple-encrypted data and decrypts them with all his keys This is a variant of the anonymous return addresses in [2] ; however, here establishes a return channel himself instead of passing a return address to This is more efficient in our scenario and will foil active attacks on by 5) Problems with Pure Mix Channels: The main problem with pure mix channels is how to get enough channels of equal length to be mixed together. For channels, this means that the setup messages belong to the same batch and the following continuous data start and end at the same time; otherwise an attacker could distinguish such channels in spite of mixing. It might be difficult enough to obtain enough connections starting at the same time, if connections must be established within, say, 3 s, without routing them unnecessarily through the longdistance network. And it is highly unlikely that enough of them end at the same time by themselves. Therefore, some users would have to wait for others before being allowed to release their channels (i.e., their NT's would send encrypted nonsense when the continuous data end). However, each user only has two channels; thus it cannot be tolerated that they are blocked.
B. Real-Time Mixes
In this section, we present the complete technique of RealTime Mixes. It solves all the remaining problems of mix channels: How does know that he should set up a mix receiving channel for 's data, and how does know the label? How do we get enough channels at each local time that start together, and how can we make them end together? The solution consists of: 1) time-slice channels; 2) dummy traffic where it costs nothing; and 3) broadcast of short connectionsetup messages.
1) Time-Slice and Dummy Channels:
Each connection is divided into a sequence of time-slice channels, that look completely unrelated to everybody except for the respective sender and recipient. With each new time slice, users can release connections and/or establish new ones. Each participant who does not need a channel during a time slice establishes a dummy time-slice channel instead. This costs no additional bandwidth because this channel is on the subscriber line only.
More precisely, during each time slice, each subscriber maintains two mix-sending channels and two mix-receiving channels through the mixes at her local exchange. They are called time-slice sending (TS-) channels and time-slice receiving (TR-) channels and the corresponding setup messages -and -setup messages. Thus, before each time slice, must send two TS-and two TR-setup messages.
The last mix at 's local exchange passes the innermost part, of each setup message to the local exchange for connection. Fig. 2 shows simplified the setup messages for a connection establishment. For any TR-setup message, only consists of a connection label Any TS-setup message contains a connection label the address of the local exchange of the corresponding recipient and information about the message to pass as well as the connection-setup message itself, i.e., -The information indicates the status of the setup message, i.e., meaningful or meaningless and the data, e.g., dummy traffic is meaningless If has a real connection with a recipient the connection labels must agree. This will be achieved by letting and generate them pseudorandomly from the same seed which will be exchanged in -described below. Recall that a real connection is duplex and realized by two independent simplex channels.
If has no real connection on one of its two duplex channels during a time slice, he sets up a simplex channel with himself instead. That is, he sends a TS-setup and a TR-setup message with the same connection label, e.g., at time slice (see Fig. 2 ). Hence these dummy channels look exactly like local connections. This makes local connections completely unobservable except for the initial wish to establish one. In this case the -field indicates this as a real, meaningful message. For long-distance connections, one can only observe which anonymity sets communicate.
The data in the data channel are treated according to the setup messages as described under mix channels, i.e., forwarded from the sending channel to the specified receiving channel (real or dummy), with one exception: During connection establishment, when the sender already designates a real recipient in the TS-setup message but does not yet send real data (compare with and we will allow her to specify that data as meaningless Thus the data (that must be mixed anyway) are thrown away on the network side instead of being unnecessarily transported through the long-distance network. If at any mix, no data arrive on a channel, the mix replaces them by random data so that no one can simply see where a channel leads by cutting it off.
2) Establishing Connections: If wants to call she needs to tell him that he should stop setting up dummy channels with himself and set them up to meet 's channels instead. Thus one connection-setup message -must be delivered to in a different way. Still, may not want to know his real location address inside his anonymity set. We achieve this by allowing implicit addresses and broadcasting short connection-setup messages in 's anonymity set, i.e., to all subscribers at 's LE.
An implicit address of allows but nobody else, to identify a message as belonging to him; see [1] for a systematic treatment. The typical cases are the following. a) Invisible Public Addresses: Here, with 's public key, encrypts the message and some redundancy that can be recognized by 's This address, i.e., the encrypted message, is called invisible because others cannot even identify whether two messages have the same address. Hence the key to build such an address, i.e., the key can be put into directories. Everybody can link the key to the user or the pseudonym but not to the real identity. For example, for Alcoholics Anonymous: wants to call Alcoholics Anonymous, their public key is available in the "Yellow Pages."
generates his message and sends it to his own which routes it to (Alcoholics Anonymous), i.e., the anonymity set where this organization belongs to. There the message is broadcast. Since the address of 's is included, the anonymous alcoholics organization may reply to on the prepared channel without revealing 's anonymity. b) Visible Private Addresses: These are simply randomly chosen labels; thus the 's of the potential recipients can evaluate them much faster. They should only be used once. For example, such an address could be used if called before and now wants to be called back. We will only consider invisible addresses further. Apart from or rather within the implicit address, -must contain: a) the address of 's local exchange, so that can address his TS-channels there; b) a seed from which and will generate the connection labels for the future time slices of this connection with a pseudorandom generator; c) the number of the time slice so that knows that this is when starts running the pseudorandom generator. Per time slice, one label is generated for the simplex channel from to and one for that from to We call them and respectively, where stands for the number of the time slice within the connection.
may also contain a key for hybrid encryption as usual, or such a key can be derived from the seed before the labels.
On 's side, -is packed into the innermost part of a TS-setup message. Thus we have no problem of finding enough other connection-setup messages to mix it with. Now all TS-setup messages must contain such a field so that they are of equal length. Recall, the additional short field indicates whether this field is a real, meaningful connectionsetup message or not.
A successful connection establishment is shown in Fig. 2 and described in the following. For each user only one of the two duplex channels with signaling and data part is shown. a) Time slice 1: Both and have no real connection. wants to establish one to Thus she indicates this in her TS-setup message. Because of -is recognized by the network side of and therefore, it is sent in the network and broadcast as connection wish by All subscribers of test whether the received message is addressed to them. Only the network termination of can recognize -which has encrypted with After decryption, finds the for the connection labels (and a symmetric key). As does not know anything about 's connection wish at the beginning of this time slice, he sets up dummy channels to himself as before, i.e., 's sends dummies on his time-slice channels to himself, using a random connection label
The field " " in the TS-setup messages characterizes his connection-setup message field as meaningless. Analogous the field " " characterizes whether meaningful or meaningless data are sent on the data channel. 's TR-setup message is random and the data channels is explicitly denoted as meaningless, i.e., so that it is not routed through the long-distance network following the TS-setup message. To keep the transparency of the data channel the -bit is implemented in the TS-setup message.
b) Time slice 2: The originator of the connection, cannot send any meaningful data yet because she does not know whether accepts the connection. Hence, is used in However, her TR-setup message sets up her TR-channel so that she can receive data from i.e., with the specified connection label [in our example As has a free channel, 's accepts the connection and builds up a TSchannel to using the address from the received connection-setup message and generating and from for the current time-slice, i.e., At the same time, 's phone starts ringing, and the data transmitted from to tell this fact. When picks up the receiver, his signals this fact to in the data channel. and are synchronized. c) Time slice 3 (and following): Now both communication partners build up their time-slice channels with the corresponding connection labels and exchange data.
2) Releasing Connections:
The ' should not release channels in the long-distance network after every time slice. Instead, they can either wait until the channel is not needed again in the next time slice, or (with slight restriction of bit transparency) the end of the connection can be signaled in the data channel. Thus for each real connection, e.g., a phone call, a channel through the long-distance network is switched once at most.
If a does not answer at once, it is no problem for anonymity because the mixes will fill up the sender's unused TR-channel.
In principle, can let her wait whether will answer for an arbitrary period of time. For example, if the connectionsetup message contains an additional field which is shown to He might end his previous connection in favor of the new one. It is then useful to include an upper bound on the time will wait after sending the connection-setup message so that will not be disturbed, nor will build up a longdistance channel to after gave up waiting. Moreover, in person should not be forced to wait on the phone, but be notified by a short ring when answers. Then will typically not have to repeat her connection-setup message to This significantly reduces the broadcast traffic on the signaling channel.
Remarks: If we allow such long waiting times, the connection labels should be generated by a pseudorandom function of the time-slice number instead of sequentially. In practice, such a function can be derived from the symmetric encryption system used.
Recall that the data on the data channels are sent continuously, i.e., the setup messages for time slice are sent on the signaling channel at the same time as the data of time slice are sent on the data channel. In this respect, the illustration of the timing in Fig. 2 is a bit simplified. 
IV. SPECIFICATION OF THE ANONYMITY PROTOCOLS FOR ISDN
We now show how the abstract Real-Time Mixes from Section III can be mapped onto an ISDN network.
A. Basic Signaling Structure of the ISDN
Signaling is the transfer of information for controlling purposes. In the ISDN, signaling and data channels are separated throughout. The signaling structure of the ISDN is commonly described as in Fig. 3 . The signaling plane consists of signaling points corresponding to the 's or transit exchanges of the communication plane, and signaling transfer points
The user plane contains the network terminations and the participants. Two different signaling protocols are used: The Common Channel Signaling System no. 7 (CCS7) in the signaling plane, and the Digital Subscriber Signaling System no. 1 (DSS1) at the user-network interface, i.e., for signaling between 's and 's on the 16-k bit/s signaling channel. CCS7 has several functional parts [18] . The Message Transfer Part, corresponding to layers 1 to 3 in the ISO OSI reference model, offers a universal transport system for signaling messages. Above it are different so-called user parts (UP) for different services. The one for the ISDN is called ISDN-UP. It additionally uses a Signaling Connection Control Part. However, we only need to modify the ISDN-UP. The ISDN protocol DSS1 covers layers one to three of the OSI model. We only have to modify layer three.
B. Overview of the Modifications to the ISDN
In the network structure, the only new components are mix cascades associated with local exchanges. Virtually, they are separated into a signaling and a communication part; this was already shown in Fig. 3 . Both the first and the last mix are connected to the local exchange, so that all the usual network functions are still handled by the 's. Physically, the mixes are of course not "in" the local exchange as the figures might suggest, because they need independent owners, but they need dedicated lines. Moreover, the performance analysis will show that we can only support anonymity sets of about 5000 users. Thus, if more 's are connected to a local exchange, they will be virtually partitioned into such sets, i.e., mixing and broadcasting connection-setup messages will only take place within such a set. We will not work out detailed protocols for the signaling among mixes and between mixes and 's where we are free, but concentrate on what needs to be modified in the existing ISDN protocols on the existing lines, where we have strict constraints. As sketched above, we only have to change CCS7.ISDN-UP and layer three of DSS1. In particular, routing, network management, and the execution of CCS7 signaling messages are unchanged. Fig. 4 gives an overview of connection establishment in the ISDN, covering both protocols, and our modifications.
The alerting and connect messages notify that 's phone is ringing and that picked up the receiver, respectively. They are sent on the data channel, represented by the light gray area in Fig. 4 . This is reasonable because these messages must be anonymous and other ways of sending them would cost more of the critical bandwidth of the signaling channel; the bit transparency is not restricted because the connection is still unused. The corresponding CCS7 messages, however, are sent in the signaling plane as usual.
The disconnect message, that tells one partner that the other put down the receiver, is treated similarly. This is a small restriction of bit transparency. One alternative is to handle a few bits of the signaling channel as an "extension" of the data channel. The messages release and release complete are not needed in the local exchange area because the connection is released automatically with every time slice. Releasing a connection is only necessary in the long-distance network. The individual messages are described separately in the following sections.
C. The Parameters and Their Length
We need the length of the mix-specific parameters to see whether they fit into the frames of the given ISDN protocols (and for the performance analysis below). The length of the ciphertext of a message in hybrid encryption of minimal length (see Section III-A) is where is the block length of the asymmetric encryption system and the key length of the symmetric system. For all contain at least one asymmetrically encrypted block, thus
The length of a mix input message (3.2) is: (4.1) for mixes. In the following, we use parameter lengths as given in Table I. With this and if is simply a time-slice number, we obtain (4.2)
D. Modification of the DSS1 Protocol
The structure of a DSS1 signaling message in layer 3 is shown in Fig. 5 .
1) Message Types and Information Elements:
The message head of a DSS1 message has a length of 32 b. The codes of the message types and information elements are given in [19, Figs. 5.19 and 5.20] . For the anonymity protocol, we need to modify their codes (see Tables II and III) .
Time-slice channels work without receipts, therefore we do not use message types like call proceeding, connect acknowledge, and setup acknowledge. As mentioned (see Fig. 4 ), the release and release complete messages can also be omitted. The information message is not needed, because all connection information is already included in the setup messages. Progress [19] ) and notify are not necessary either. Omitting all these messages reduces the data on the signaling channel, which is critical for performance.
The codes of existing message types and information elements (IE's) are maintained (see Table III ). New elements obtain codes which were or became free. Some of the IE's originally belonged to the signaling channel. They are still required, but shifted to the data channel. The following IE's must be omitted for anonymity: calling party number, calling party subaddress, called party number, and called party subaddress. The following IE's are omitted because they are not needed or not used by the PTT's: notification indicator, display, date/time, and sending complete. The new IE's TSand TR-information, as well as the new MT connectionsetup contain the cryptographic data of our TS-and TR-setup and connection-setup messages, respectively. The IE's alerting information and connected information are mix information that need to be sent with alerting and connect/disconnect messages. The coding rules are described in [19] and [20] .
2) Complete Signaling Messages of the DSS1:
We now show the entire structure of the new message types. a) TR-setup: This message is used to set up the time-slice receiving channel between a and a It contains the TR-setup message in the sense of Section III as an IE. The innermost part is a channel label For example, for three mixes, -By (4.2), the length of this information element in bits is A complete TR-setup message is given in Table VI . The length of a DSS1 layer-three message is limited to 260 byte. Longer messages can be segmented according to [20, Annex K] , but currently no European PTT supports this. Hence, either a segmentation procedure must be implemented or the number of mixes, must be small enough. In the latter for example, with eight mixes the TR-setup message is 224 byte long and the longest message, TS-setup, 250 byte.
b) TS-setup:
This message is used to set up a TS-channel between a and a Its IE contains the TS-setup message in the sense of Section III. According to Fig. 2 These messages are sent in the data channel when the phone starts ringing at the recipient's side (see Fig. 4 ), so that the sender can get the ringing tone. The messages are where the keys are those from the corresponding setup messages. To handle such messages, must read information on the data channel, and the 's must not encrypt these signaling messages with the symmetric key from the connection-setup message. The message lengths are 22 and 8 b, independent of the number of mixes. Connect and disconnect messages: They are sent if the recipient has picked up the receiver:
The disconnect messages signal the end of the communication.
If is the party who puts down the telephone receiver then Their natural lengths are 22 and 8 b; if we send them in the data channel they should be so that, given that the data channel is encrypted, the probability that they occur by chance is smaller than other error probabilities of the ISDN.
E. Modification of the CCS7 Protocol 1) Message Types and Information Elements:
The functional structure of CCS7 and especially the tasks of the ISDN-UP were sketched in Section IV-A.
The message types (IAM, etc.) and their codes remain unchanged. The codes of existing IE's are also maintained according to [21, Table 5 ]. New elements obtain codes which were or became free (see Table IV ).
In contrast to the original code, the data channel must now be switched symmetrically for realization of anonymous signaling.
2) Complete Signaling Messages in the CCS7 Protocol: IAM:
The IAM message is originated by the DSS1 TSsetup message. It signals the recipient that somebody is calling him. Only can notice this message after he has correctly deciphered the connection-setup message broadcast by -The modified structure of an IAM message as well as of the following messages is given in the Appendix. All maintained, discarded, and new parameters of the mandatory fixed, the mandatory variable and the optional parts of these messages (see Fig. 6 ) as well as their lengths are shown in Table VII . Some of the original parameters were discarded to guarantee anonymity of the subscribers.
It is no problem to send longer messages since message segmentation is implemented in CCS7.
ACM (address complete message):
If an alerting message arrives, builds:
Hereby, uses the stored data, i.e., the channel identifier of the receiving channel of the sender (cf. it is signaled that the recipient has dropped the line and therefore ended the communication. Additionally, knows that the data channel in the long-distance network can be released (cf . Table VII) .
RLC (release complete):
This message has not been modified by the proposed protocol. It is used as a receipt of the REL message where knows that the data channel is now released. RLC contains only the parameter cause identifier that describes the purpose of release. 
V. PERFORMANCE
The main question of the performance analysis is whether the signaling channels between the 's and 's can support all our new time-slice setup messages and the broadcast of connection-setup messages. All the other changes have no significant effect upon performance. Table V shows the length of all modified and their corresponding original messages. The original lengths of DSS1 and ISDN-UP signaling messages were determined from [20] and [21] (first row). Section IV D and discussed the parameters of mix input and signaling messages. From this the length of the new IE's (second row) is calculated for ten mixes. The lengths of the complete modified signaling messages are then given in row three and four (for five and ten mixes), that is, the results of the fourth row are determined by adding the second row and the results of the first row after all maintained, discarded, and new parameters from the original message were considered.
A. Comparing the Length of the Modified ISDN Messages

B. Minimal Duration of a Time Slice
A time slice must be long enough so that the four time-slice setup messages can be sent on each local signaling channel.
The total bandwidth of the signaling channel, in each direction, is 16 kb/s. Some of it must be used for error control, several narrowband services and other signaling messages. We restrict us and use only 12 kb/s for connection-establishment messages. Since the signaling channel is a full duplex channel, broadcasting the connection-setup messages does not conflict with the setup messages. As stated in Section III, a recipient has to test every connection-setup message. This does not mean testing the whole message, rather he attempts to decrypt the first asymmetric block of every connection-setup message. The resulting overhead is tolerable since asymmetric encryption handles hundreds of k bit/s but there are only 12 kb of data per second.
Each must be able to transmit two TR-and two TSsetup messages at its signaling channel, hence --Therefore if ten mixes are used for every cascade. Thus, a lower bound on the length of a time slice is 0.7 s. If five mixes are used, then s. See Fig. 7 for more cases. If a time-slice is 0.7 s, a subscriber must wait on average 0.35 s before he can set up a connection.
C. Size of an Anonymity Set
The size of an anonymity set is limited by the distribution of the connection-setup messages. To evaluate this, data about busy hour, connection-establishment attempts are needed. We use a very conservative bound of a worst-case average of 12 connection-setup messages to each subscriber in every hour, i.e., an arrival rate of s Every connection-setup message is 660 b long, independent of the number of mixes. At most -messages can be broadcast per second where is the available bandwidth. For kb/s, this is s Fig. 7 . Dependence of the minimal time slice length and the number of mixes used. The system is approximately an M/D/1 queueing system. The system time, i.e., the average time a connection-setup message needs after arriving at is then (see [22] )
If we require an upper bound of s we obtain for the size of an anonymity set. More values are shown in Fig. 8 . If more users are connected to a the upper bound of increases. Hence, the average number of connection wishes must be reduced.
The number of anonymity sets is restricted by the number of 's which can be supported. For addressing a 14 b are allowed by the ISDN standard.
D. Connection-Establishment Time
The time needed for the computations, both at the terminal equipment and at the mixes can be made almost negligible, say 0.01 s, if we use sufficiently parallel hardware in the mixes. Thus the time until a connection from to has been established mainly consists of the following parts, if accepts this connection at once: 1) waiting until 's mix cascade mixes TS-setup messages 2) delay time of the mix cascade of s); 3) connection establishment in the long-distance network s); 4) waiting until the connection-setup message is broadcast to (in peak hours s on average); 5) waiting until can establish a mix channel with 6) delay time of the mix cascade of s). The sum is s With the figures used above, in particular s, this is about 2.3 s. On average, the connection establishment will take about half as long; see Fig. 9 . 
VI. REMARKS ON ACTIVE ATTACKS AND BILLING
A. Active Attacks
We have already prevented one active attack in Section III-B by letting the mixes fill up channels where no data arrives. We can also prevent an active attack on availability that is special to our protocol: An attacker could particularly easily clog the signaling channel by sending large numbers of senseless connection-setup messages. To prevent this, priority tokens for them could be introduced by which the LE of the recipient determines the broadcast order. No token is needed for the lowest priority. Each participant only obtains a limited number of high-priority tokens from the PTT. The tokens are signed by the PTT using blind signatures like in an anonymous payment systems [9] , but free of charge.
Some more difficult active attacks, however, cannot be prevented completely. They all exploit situations where an attacker knows that an anonymous participant should react in some way. The attacker then prevents a real participant from reacting, e.g., by cutting her line. Thus, if reacts, has been proved, and if does not react, it is likely that If or an attacker on 's subscriber line modifies the data on this line and colludes with they can test whether is 's current communication partner, because will receive nonsense in this case. A similar attack is to block 's resources, e.g., by establishing two nonanonymous connections with If the attacker can then establish a connection with too, then Such attacks cannot be prevented. However, they need the collusion of the communication partner of and one must disturb lots of participants to carry them out. Hence this seems acceptable in practice.
Another attack is to disrupt the broadcast of connectionsetup messages: Assume or an attacker on the subscriber lines causes an connection-setup message to be handed to only. Then, if the connection is accepted, must be the recipient. This attack can be detected if each network termination sends a digital signature of (a hash value of) all messages received on the broadcast channel back to each mix, e.g., once per time slice. If a mix detects an inconsistency, one can try to localize the attacker; the mixes must also sign their outputs for this purpose. So far we deliberately ignored the problem that a user has to trust her or his to perform the anonymizing operations correctly and not to reveal secrets to unauthorized parties. In a real-world implementation, this implies, e.g., that these parts of the 's must not be controlled by the network operator, but by the users themselves.
B. Billing
For local connections, i.e., inside an anonymity set, flatrate accounting could be used because they do not use shared resources. Then billing is necessary for long-distance connections only. Billing anonymous connections can be done via local counters in the network terminations or an anonymous payment system [9] , [23] . In the latter case, the subscribers buy so-called stamps from the PTT from time to time, which are special messages signed by the PTT using blind signatures. These stamps can be included in the TS-setup messages, for example. For equal length, all TS-setup messages then need a stamp field, but a meaningful stamp is only needed if a longdistance channel is set up, i.e., if the address is non-local and the bit for the data is set.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented techniques extending mixes for efficient continuous, real-time communication.
They can be used for various communication systems. As a practical example, we have shown that anonymous telephony is feasible under the technical assumptions made by the PTT's for the narrowband ISDN. The service considered in this paper [19] , AND [21] (a)
is the creation of a 64-k b/s duplex channel between network terminations with connection establishment times of about 3 s. Participants are anonymous within fixed anonymity sets of about 5000 subscribers, i.e., connections can only be traced to such a group. The performance analysis shows that the costs of the changes to the ISDN network structure and its signaling procedures are acceptable.
We did not describe additional ISDN features such as call forwarding, but most of them could also be realized without giving up anonymity. Recall, however, that we described accounting procedures, and that anonymous communication does not complicate identification on higher layers, e.g., by digital signatures, where that is needed.
Remaining problems are that it may not be trivial to organize the responsibility for the mixes so that every participant trusts at least one mix including its hardware and operating system, and that there are no efficient countermeasures against some specific active attacks on anonymity. Moreover, the security [19] , AND [21] (b) of all mix schemes relies on computational assumptions. However, active attacks directed against specific participants are also possible outside a network, and computational assumptions are also used with other security primitives. Hence the security achieved seems quite satisfactory for practical purposes.
Let us conclude that, although communication technologies and services develop very fast, it is possible to maintain user privacy, and that the task of doing so should not be neglected.
APPENDIX
See Tables VI and VII. 
